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Recent Decisions
youth from the ordeal of trial, the ordeal of trial is no more exasperat:
ing to the youthful offender than commitment behind a barbed fence.
The Sixth Amendment is not concerned with informality; nor with
flexibility; rather, it requires a jury trial for all and it does not exclude
children. Constitutional rights cannot be balanced upon a scale of
flexibility and informality-they are too few and too precious. As Jus-
tice Musmanno stated in Holme's Appeal:
What a child charged with crime is entitled to, is justice, not parens
patriae . . . (Emphasis Justice Musmanno.)51
Joseph E. Vogrin, III
JUVENILES-ADJUDICATION OF DELINQUENCY-MAXIMUM SENTENCES-
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that a juvenile may be
sentenced to a longer maximum commitment than an adult tried for
the same crime if the following conditions are present: 1.) the juvenile
is notified at the outset of the proceedings of all factors upon which the
state proposes to base the adjudication; 2.) the facts supporting the
ultimate conclusions must be clearly found and set forth; and, 3.) it
must be clear that during the longer commitment the juvenile will
receive appropriate rehabilitative care.
Wilson Appeal, 438 Pa. 425, 264 A.2d 614 (1970).
On June 2, 1968, Charles Laverne Wilson and several other youths
became involved in an interracial street fight in Lancaster, Pennsyl-
vania. Although no one was seriously injured in the fray, and Wilson's
involvement was confined to throwing a few punches, juvenile delin-
quency proceedings were subsequently brought against him.
During the delinquency hearing, the judge considered not only the
street fight incident, but also Wilson's prior school suspension and
burglary conviction as significant factors in finding him a delinquent.
Neither Wilson's counsel nor his parents had any notice that these two
additional factors would be considered in this hearing.
Wilson was adjudged a delinquent and was sentenced to the State
Correctional Institution at Camp Hill, Pennsylvania.1 His sentence,
51. 109 A.2d at 530.
1. 438 Pa. 425, 264 A.2d 614 (1970).
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based on two charges of simple assault and battery, was for commitment
to Camp Hill for an indefinite period of time, not to extend beyond
his twenty-first birthday. Since he was sixteen at the time, the maximum
possible commitment was five years. If Wilson had been tried as an
adult four years would have been the maximum sentence.2
HISTORY OF THE JUVENILE COURT
From the inception of the first separate court for juveniles, estab-
lished April 21, 1899 by the Illinois legislature,$ the legal philosophy
of juvenile courts has differed significantly from that of the ordinary
criminal tribunal. Juvenile court hearings are termed "civil"; they are
designed to spare the child from the psychological ordeal of a criminal
trial, and perhaps from being labeled a criminal. 4 No stigma of punish-
ment should pervade the proceeding. Rather it should take place in
a friendly, informal atmosphere, where the state, acting as "parens
patriae," 5 uses its rehabilitative facilities to intervene where the natural
parent has failed to correct the juvenile's delinquent behavior. Any
deleterious effect imprisonment might have on the child should be
minimized by the therapeutic rather than the punitive restrictions
imposed at the juvenile institution. 6
Too often however, "parens patriae" has been used to the dis-
advantage of the juvenile by judges who disregard the ideals on which
juvenile courts are based. In informal juvenile proceedings, a judge,
acting as a friendly counselor, has sentenced a boy to a state training
school because of "the deterrent effect which the commitment would
have upon other juveniles."7 The designation of the proceeding as
"civil", not "criminal", has given juvenile courts the ability to deprive
a child of his liberty for seven years for petty larceny, a crime carrying
a two year sentence for an adult.8 The rehabilitative and industrial
schools, where delinquent children have been sent, "despite their
2. Wilson Appeal, 214 Pa. Super. 160, 251 A.2d 671 (1969).
3. Dunne, The Juvenile Delinquent, Who Is He?, 49 Cm. B. REc. 62, 63 (1967).
4. Spencer, Beyond Gault And Whittington-The Best of Both Worlds?, 22 U. MIAMn
L. Rav. 906, 911 (1968).
5. Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 A. 678 (1923), is the most often cited opinion.
.6. Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile Court, 7 CQuME AND DELINQUENCY,
97, 101 (1961).
7. State v. Myers, 74 N.D. 297, 22 N.W.2d 199 (1946).
8. Commonwealth v. Fischer, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905).
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lofty purpose, are frequently little better than prisons for the young."
By 1966, the philosophy of the juvenile court had come full circle.
Due to the failure of the state to even approach the role of "step-
parents" of the juvenile, the only real significance that remained of
'parens patriae' was completely incongruous with its original purpose.
The philosophy was being used as an invalid substitute for procedural
due process guaranteed to all by the Fourteenth Amendment.
THE PERUOD OF EVOLUTION
The Supreme Court of the United States in Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541 (1966), took the first step in correcting the constitutional
inequities raised by juvenile court proceedings. Justice Fortas, speaking
for the majority stated:
(w)hile there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of the
juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious
questions as to whether actual performance measures well enough
against theoretical purpose ... there may be grounds for concern
that the child gets the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither
the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and re-
generative treatment postulated for children.10
Although the Court declined the invitation to apply all constitu-
tional guarantees applicable to adults charged with serious crimes to
juvenile court proceedings," the majority did state: "we do hold that
the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and
fair treatment.' 1 2 This decision, although a very significant first step
in restoring fundamental fairness to the juvenile adjudication process,
was far overshadowed a year later when the United States Supreme
Court decided In Re Gault.13
In Gault, with Justice Fortas again speaking for the majority, the
Court held the following four rights fundamental and necessary in
all juvenile proceedings: 1.) Due process requires that adequate writ-
ten notice be afforded the child and his parents with regard to the
9. Hamilton, "In Re Gault And The Perishing Questions of Procedural Due Process
and Legal Ethics In Juvenile Courts, 47 NEB. L. Ray. 558, 562 (1968); Paulsen, Fairness To
The Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547 (1957).
10. Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
11. Id. at 556.
12. Id. at 562.
13. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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specific issues that must be met; 2.) the right to counsel; 3.) the privilege
against self-incrimination; and 4.) the right to confront witnesses. The
Court, also, reiterated Kent by stating that the hearing must measure
up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. The designation
of these rights as fundamental caused a tremendous impact on juvenile
court proceedings. However, the greatest effect of Gault may well be
the implications of its language.' 4 This will be discussed in the follow-
ing analysis of the principal case.
Wilson
In the Wilson juvenile hearing, the court blatantly disregarded the
notice requirement of Gault by failing to alert the defendant's parents
and his counsel that his prior burglary and school suspension would
be considered in the determination of delinquency. Relying on Gault,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania corrected the failure of notice and
the procedural errors of the juvenile hearing. However, the court in-
adequately dealt with the Equal Protection argument advanced by
Wilson's counsel.
In Pennsylvania, a minor between the ages of 16 and 18 years can,
at the discretion of the court, be treated either as an adult criminal
offender and be tried in criminal court, or as a juvenile and be tried
under the Juvenile Court Act. 5 Usually a juvenile vigorously fights
any attempt to place him before the adult court, fearing longer sen-
tence. However, in this case, had Wilson been tried in adult criminal
court, which was possible because he was sixteen years of age, the max-
imum sentence for two counts of simple assault and battery would have
been four years. Before the juvenile court, his "parens patriae",
Wilson's sentence was until majority, a period of five years.
He was committed to Camp Hill where only those delinquents "who
have committed the most serious and heinous crimes and who have
the poorest records are sent .... "I Had Charles Wilson been tried as
an adult, he probably would have ended up in the same prison, a max-
imum security facility designed to house hardened criminals, where
sixteen-year-old juveniles share common quarters with prisoners up to
twenty-five years of age who have been sentenced by adult criminal
courts.1
7
14. Spencer, supra note 4, at 916.
15. Commonwealth ex rel. Firmstone v. Myers, 202 Pa. Super. 292, 196 A.2d 209 (1964).
Act of June 2, 1933, P.L. 1433 § 14 as amended, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 256 (1965).
16. 214 Pa. Super. at 167, 251 A.2d at 675.
17. Id. at 170, 251 A.2d at 676.
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Justice Roberts speaking for the
majority, stated that Charles Wilson had been denied Equal Protection
afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. Citing Commonwealth v.
Daniel,18 the court stated, "(i)f the commonwealth wishes to make the
individuals guilty of similar conduct eligible for maximum sentences of
varying lengths, it must demonstrate that the distinctions which it
makes are based on some relevant and reasonable classification." 19 The
court concluded: "there can be no constitutionally valid distinction
between a juvenile and an adult offender which justifies making one
of them subject to a maximum commitment in the same institution
for the same conduct." 20
The court's analysis, to this point, dealt particularly with the facts
in the instant case, and, if viewed in this limited context, is substan-
tially correct. Charles Wilson was sentenced by the juvenile court to
five years at Camp Hill. If he had been tried in an adult proceeding his
maximum sentence would have been four years, probably at the same
institution. The mere fact that the offender is a juvenile is not the
reasonable distinction needed to prescribe a greater than maximum
commitment.
However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania dilutes its Equal Pro-
tection holding by enunciating three factors, which if present, allow the
commitment of a juvenile for a longer maximum sentence than an
adult. The three factors are the following:
1.) The juvenile must have notice at the outset of the proceeding
of any and all factors upon which the state proposes to base the
adjudication of delinquency;
2.) The ultimate conclusions upon which the finding of delin-
quency is based, and the facts supporting each of them, must
be clearly found and set forth in the adjudication;
8.) It must be clear that the longer commitment will result in
the juvenile's receiving appropriate rehabilitative care and
not just in his being deprived of his liberty for a longer time.21
The first two elements considered essential by the court-notice and
the clear expression of relevant facts-are fundamental rights guaran-
teed under Gault. Since the first two factors announced are needed in
every juvenile court trial, the supreme court's rationale for allowing
longer juvenile incarceration must be found in the third element.
18. 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968).
19. 438 Pa. at 431, 264 A.2d at 617.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 432, 264 A.2d at 618.
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In other words, Charles Wilson, when retried with correct procedural
process, may still receive the five-year sentence handed down in his
initial hearing. The only difference is that Wilson will not be sent
to Camp Hill but to another institution. It is the author's contention
that this factual distinction is not a "relevant and reasonable classifica-
tion." Such action is a regression by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
to a hollow philosophical justification for denying the constitutional
rights of a juvenile. While the distinction might be valid in an ideal
sense, reality dictates the fundamental unfairness of such a holding.
It is in fact a denial of Equal Protection.
Even if juvenile institutions served a strictly rehabilitative rather
than penal function, which few do, how will the courts make certain
that the child receives proper rehabilitative care once he is committed?
In a concurring opinion, Justice Cohen stated: "Use of this approach
will require courts to guess what the defendant will be doing and
what will be done for him during the period of commitment, and it
is being unrealistic to expect that the courts can make such a deter-
mination in a meaningful way."22
The Supreme Court of the United States in Gault considered the
distinction between an adult and juvenile institution, which had been
used many times in the past in the 'parens patriae' philosophy.
The Court said:
It is of no constitutional consequence-and of limited practical
meaning-thait the institution to which he is committed is called
an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however
euphemistic the title "receiving home" or "industrial school" for
juveniles is an institution of confinement where the child is in-
carcerated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes 'a build-
ing with white-washed walls, regimented routine and industrial
hours. Instead of a mother and father and brother and sister and
friends and classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians,
state employees and 'delinquents' confined with him for anything
from waywardness to rape and homicide'.
23
Although this is dictum, it is evident that the Supreme Court of
the United States no longer is prepared to condone the mere use of the
words 'parens patriae' to deny a juvenile his constitutionally guaranteed
rights of due process. The words must have some significant meaning,
which in Wilson's case means that the institutions to which juveniles
22. Id. at 434, 264 A.2d at 619.
25. 587 us. at 27.
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are sent must differ substantially from adult prisons. The fact is that
they do not in terms of treatment and surroundings. Assuming that
juvenile institutions do, in fact, differ significantly from adult prisons,
the rationale for longer incarceration still may not be adequate. The
juvenile still is deprived of his liberty-this is the dominant factor in
any imprisonment, not whether rehabilitative services are available.
CONCLUSION
The author submits that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has acted
in a manner contradictory to the clear implication of Gault and to the
interests of the juvenile. The situation gave the Pennsylvania court an
opportunity to continue in the progressive process that marks the
juvenile proceedings at this time. While the courts of other states seek
to strike the correct balance between the philosophy of juvenile courts
and constitutional rights afforded adults, Pennsylvania's highest tri-
bunal seeks to return to a past rationale, the inequity of which is readily
apparent.
The nagging question is: "What true purpose can a longer incarcera-
tion serve for a juvenile?" The only answer that arises is that it allows
more time for the young adult involved to form and nourish a hate for
an unfair system.
It is suggested that there is no purposeful and significant reason for
withholding Equal Protection of the law from a juvenile who could be
either tried in a juvenile or an adult criminal proceeding. Considering
the tempo of the times, fair and equal treatment of a juvenile may aid
his rehabilitation far more than any period of added incarceration.
James R. Miller
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